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CASE COMMENTS

transfer to be set aside, it does not provide for damages against
those who participate in the fraudulent conspiracy which is the
issue in the principal case. By statute, W. VA. CoDE ch. 38, art. 3, §
6 (Michie 1961), it is provided that every judgment for money
rendered in West Virginia shall be a lien on all the real estate
of or to which the defendant in the judgment is or becomes
possessed or entitled, at or after the date of the judgment, and the
lien shall continue so long as the judgment remains valid and enforceable. However, this lien is not effective against a bona fide
purchaser until it is docketed in the county where the real estate
is located. W. VA. CODE ch. 38, art. 3, § 7 (Michie 1961).
These statutes create a lien only where the property is located
within the state. If the real estate conveyed is located outside the
state, perhaps the West Virginia court will follow the law of the
principal case. As the court in Yates v. Joyce, supra, said, "The
common law abhors all manner of fraud, and wherever a person
is injured by the fraudulent acts or contrivance of another, it will
afford a remedy." While it is understandable that a general
creditor who has no lien nor judgment may be denied an action for
damages, the interest of a party who has spent time and money to
obtain a judgment should be protected from those who fradulently
conspire to deny him the fruits of his effort. If the debtor's acts
are designed to prevent satisfaction of this judgment, the debtor
and his conspirators should be required to compensate the judgment
creditor for expenses or losses occasioned by their acts.
John Welton Fisher,II

Mortgages-The Doctrine of Future Advances
X, a corporation, borrowed money for the purpose of building
homes upon certain real estate and executed a construction loan
deed of trust upon the real estate to secure the loan. The deed
of trust provided for a schedule of payments and that the lender
could advance any part of, or the whole of, any payment before it
became due, and the same would be deemed to be made in pursuance of the agreement. In a proceeding involving disbursement of
proceeds of foreclosure sales, the circuit court ratified the auditor's
reports disbursing proceeds to the holder of X's notes secured by
the first deed of trust, and the trustee in bankruptcy and suppliers
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of the builders, appealed. Held, affirmed. The lender was free to
advance money as it wished as far as X's creditors without liens
were concerned, in absence of fraud or bad faith, and the lender
did not lose priority of its lien as to money advanced with knowledge of unpaid claims of potential mechanic lienors. Lamar v.
Nylen, 215 A.2d 806 (Md. 1966).
The principal case represents a problem that often arises in the
business of mortgage financing. The most frequent conflict occurs
between mortgages executed with provisions for future advances
and mechanics' liens which may intervene before the subsequent
advances are made. It is possible for the entire amount of the
loan to be advanced prior to construction, but the usual procedure
is for the money to be advanced in installments as construction goes
along. In order for the question of priority to arise, an assumption
must be made that the securing instrument is recorded before any
work is done or any material is furnished in connection with construction. If the facts were otherwise, the mortgage would be subject to all mechanics' liens which may be perfected.
Many courts have made a distinction in cases where the making
of the advance is obligatory upon the mortgagee or beneficiary. In
such cases, in the absence of contrary statutes, mortgages recorded
prior to the attachment of the lien secure the advances given subsequent to the attachment of the mechanic's lien. Potwin State Bank
v. J. B. Houston & Son Lumber Co., 183 Kan. 475, 327 P.2d 1091
(1958). This rule also has been frequently applied even where the
mortgagee knew at the time he made the advance that the
mechanic's lien had attached. Oaks v. Weingartner, 105 Cal.App.
2d 598, 234 P.2d 194 (1951). There seems to be no West Virginia
authority on the above issues, but one writer has indicated that
the above rule would be applied in West Virginia. Stealey,
The Mortgage for Future Advances in West Virginia, 56 W. VA. L.
REv. 107 (1954).
If the future advances are optional, rather than obligatory,
further problems arise. The West Virginia court, citing JoNEs,
MORTGAc-S § 372 (6th ed. 1933), stated that by the weight of
authority a prior mortgage is affected only by actual notice of a
subsequent mortgage. The prior mortgage is a valid security for
all advances made before such notice is received. The duty to give
actual notice lies with the subsequent mortgagee, and he should be
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required to perform such duty if he wishes to stop further advances
from being secured by the prior mortgage. Hall v. Williamson
Grocery Co., 69 W.Va. 671, 675, 72 S.E. 780, 781 (1911). The New
Mexico court in Heller v. Gate City Bldg. & Loan Asen, 75 N.M.
596, 408 P.2d 753 (1965), reiterated the above position stating that
there is an overwhelming agreement among the courts that a first
mortgagee, making optional future advances under the first mortgage with actual knowledge of an intervening lien, will not retain
priority as to subsequent advances over the intervening lien. The
court reasoned that this seemed to be the better rule. A contrary
rule would place a mortgagor, who is unable to demand advances
from the holder of the first mortgage, in the unfortunate position
of also being unable to borrow on his property from another person.
The reason for this arises from the possibility that, after the mortgagor gives a second mortgage, the holder of the first mortgage
might make advances to the mortgagor and such advances would
take priority over the claim of the second mortgagee.
All West Virginia cases in point seem to involve the optional
future advance and are in accord with the majority rule in other
jurisdictions, which gives them priority to subsequent liens, except
after actual notice on the part of the first mortgagee. Stealey,
supra. No applicable West Virginia cases have been decided since
the publishing of the above article.
Thus, it seems that mortgages for future advances remain susceptible to certain pitfalls. The major pitfall is likely to occur in
the case of optional advances when the mortgages has actual notice
of intervening liens. Whether notice is sufficient to be considered
actual is a question of fact. Mr. Stealey makes several suggestions
as to what the law should be pertaining to such mortgages. It is
his opinion that a duly recorded mortgage or deed of trust for
future advances, optional or not, which states with sufficient
clarity the amount and character of future advances which it is
intended to secure should take priority as to future advances over
subsequent incumbrances regardless of actual notice of the subsequent lien. This would constitute a departure from the majority
rule and the affiliated reasoning in the case of Heller v. Gate City
Bldg. & Loan Asin, supra. The writer advocates such a rule
because of the existence of many corporate lenders. It is extremely
impractical to apply the rule of actual notice to a corporation because notice may not be communicated through the channels to
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the officer handling the advances. Under the present rule the only
safe course for a corporate lender would be to make a complete
investigation before each advance is made. Stealey, supra.
Until legislation changes the present status of the law in West
Virginia as to mortgages for future advances, the mortgagee will
remain subjected to existing risks.
James Truman Cooper

Taxation and Interstate Commerce
P, the State Tax Commissioner, instituted a declaratory judgment
proceeding in order to determine whether taxes paid by D, a
West Virginia corporation, had been unlawfully collected. D had
been acting as a merchandise broker pursuant to a franchise arrangement under which D had been granted the right to represent
exclusively certain food processors located outside West Virginia.
All of D's business activities of soliciting, securing and preparing
merchandise orders took place in West Virginia. After such orders
had been secured, they were sent to the food processors who reserved the right to accept or reject the orders and, upon acceptance,
filled the orders and arranged for delivery of the merchandise by
common carrier F.O.B. point of shipment to the purchasers in
West Virginia. The billing was sent directly to the purchaser by
the processor, and payment was made directly to the processor.
The circuit court directed P to refund the taxes because the collection contravened the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Held,
reversed. The imposition of a state gross earnings tax on the
commissions paid by nonresident sellers to the manufacturer's
representative for its services in soliciting, obtaining and transmitting orders within the state was not a violation of the commerce clause. State ex rel. Battle v. B. D. Bailey & Sons, 146
S.E.2d 686 (W. Va. 1966).
The principal case presents two basic constitutional factors
which have been before the courts many times. (1) One basic
principle is that in the federal system the authority of a state is
limited to its own geographical territory, and therefore, it may not
tax persons, things or events not within its own boundaries. New
York Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
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